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Abstract
Recurrent neural networks (RNNs) represent the state
of the art in translation, image captioning, and speech
recognition. They are also capable of learning algorithmic
tasks such as long addition, copying, and sorting from a
set of training examples. We demonstrate that RNNs can
learn decryption algorithms – the mappings from plain-
text to ciphertext – for three polyalphabetic ciphers (Vi-
genere, Autokey, and Enigma). Most notably, we demon-
strate that an RNN with a 3000-unit Long Short-Term
Memory (LSTM) cell can learn the decryption function
of the Enigma machine. We argue that our model learns
efficient internal representations of these ciphers 1) by ex-
ploring activations of individual memory neurons and 2)
by comparing memory usage across the three ciphers. To
be clear, our work is not aimed at ’cracking’ the Enigma
cipher. However, we do show that our model can perform
elementary cryptanalysis by running known-plaintext at-
tacks on the Vigenere and Autokey ciphers. Our results
indicate that RNNs can learn algorithmic representations
of black box polyalphabetic ciphers and that these repre-
sentations are useful for cryptanalysis.
Introduction
Given an encrypted sequence, a key and a decryption of that
sequence, can we reconstruct the decryption function? We
might begin by looking for small patterns shared by the two
sequences. When we find these patterns, we can piece them
together to create a rough model of the unknown function.
Next, we might use this model to predict the translations of
other sequences. Finally, we can refine our model based on
whether or not these guesses are correct.
During WWII, Allied cryptographers used this process to
make sense of the Nazi Enigma cipher, eventually recon-
structing the machine almost entirely from its inputs and
outputs (Rejewski 1981). This achievement was the prod-
uct of continuous effort by dozens of engineers and mathe-
maticians. Cryptography has improved in the past century,
but piecing together the decryption function of a black box
cipher such as the Enigma is still a problem that requires
expert domain knowledge and days of labor.
The process of reconstructing a cipher’s inner workings
is the first step of cryptanalysis. Several past works have
Copyright c© 2018, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
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Figure 1: Our LSTM-based model can learn the decryption
function of the Enigma from a series of ciphertext and plain-
text examples.
sought to automate – and thereby accelerate – this process,
but they generally suffer from a lack of generality (see Re-
lated Work). To address this issue, several works have dis-
cussed the connection between machine learning and cryp-
tography (Kearns and Valiant 1994) (Prajapat and Thankur
2015). Early work at the confluence of these two fields
has been either theoretical or limited to toy examples. We
improve upon this work by introducing a general-purpose
model for learning and characterizing polyalphabetic ci-
phers.
Our approach is to frame the decryption process as a
sequence-to-sequence translation task and use a Recurrent
Neural Network (RNN) -based model to learn the transla-
tion function. Unlike previous works, our model can be ap-
plied to any polyalphabetic cipher. We demonstrate its ef-
fectiveness by using the same model and hyperparameters
(except for memory size) to learn three different ciphers: the
Vigenere, Autokey, and Enigma. Once trained, our model
performs well on 1) unseen keys and 2) ciphertext sequences
much longer than those of the training set. All code is avail-
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By visualizing the activations of our model’s memory
vector, we argue that it can learn efficient internal represen-
tations of ciphers. To confirm this theory, we show that the
amount of memory our model needs to master each cipher
scales with the cipher’s degree of time-dependence. Finally,
we train our model to perform known-plaintext attacks on
the Vigenere and Autokey ciphers, demonstrating that these
internal representations are useful tools for cryptanalysis.
To be clear, our objective was not to crack the Enigma.
The Enigma was cracked nearly a century ago using fewer
computations than that of a single forward pass through our
model. The best techniques for cracking ciphers are hand-
crafted approaches that capitalize on weaknesses of specific
ciphers. This project is meant to showcase the impressive
ability of RNNs to uncover information about unknown ci-
phers in a fully automated way.
In summary, our key contribution is that RNNs can learn
algorithmic representations of complex polyalphabetic ci-
phers and that these representations are useful for cryptanal-
ysis.
Related work
Recurrent models, in particular those that use Long Short-
Term Memory (LSTM), are a powerful tool for manipu-
lating sequential data. Notable applications include state-
of-the art results in handwriting recognition and genera-
tion (Graves 2014), speech recognition (Graves, Mohamed,
and Hinton 2013), machine translation (Sutskever, Vinyals,
and Le 2014), deep reinforcement learning (Mnih et al.
2016), and image captioning (Karpathy and Fei-Fei 2015).
Like these works, we frame our application of RNNs as a
sequence-to-sequence translation task. Unlike these works,
our translation task requires 1) a keyphrase and 2) recon-
structing a deterministic algorithm. Fortunately, a wealth of
previous work has focused on using RNNs to learn algo-
rithms.
Past work has shown that RNNs can find general solutions
to algorithmic tasks. Zaremba and Sutskever (Zaremba and
Sutskever 2015) trained LSTMs to add 9-digit numbers with
99% accuracy using a variant of curriculum learning. Graves
et. al. (Graves, Wayne, and Danihelka 2014) compared the
performance of LSTMs to Neural Turing Machines (NTMs)
on a range of algorithmic tasks including sort and repeat-
copy. More recently, Graves et al. (Graves et al. 2016) intro-
duced the Differentiable Neural Computer (DNC) and used
it to solve more challenging tasks such as relational reason-
ing over graphs. As with these works, our work shows that
RNNs can master simple algorithmic tasks. However, un-
like tasks such as long addition and repeat-copy, learning
the Enigma is a task that humans once found difficult.
In the 1930s, Allied nations had not yet captured a
physical Enigma machine. Cryptographers such as the Pol-
ish Marian Rejewski were forced to compare plaintext,
keyphrase, and ciphertext messages with each other to in-
fer the mechanics of the machine. After several years of
1https://github.com/greydanus/crypto-rnn
carefully analyzing these messages, Rejewski and the Pol-
ish Cipher Bureau were able to construct ’Enigma doubles’
without ever having seen an actual Enigma machine (Rejew-
ski 1981). This is the same problem we trained our model to
solve. Like Rejewski, our model uncovers the logic of the
Enigma by looking for statistical patterns in a large number
of plaintext, keyphrase, and ciphertext examples. We should
note, however, that Rejewski needed far less data to make the
same generalizations. Later in World War II, British cryp-
tographers led by Alan Turing helped to actually crack the
Enigma. As Turing’s approach capitalized on operator error
and expert knowledge about the Enigma, we consider it be-
yond the scope of this work (Sebag-Montefiore 2000).
Characterizing unknown ciphers is a central problem in
cryptography. The comprehensive Applied Cryptography
(Schneier 1996) lists a wealth of methods, from frequency
analysis to chosen-plaintext attacks. Papers such as (Daw-
son, Gustafson, and Davies 1991) offer additional methods.
While these methods can be effective under the right condi-
tions, they do not generalize well outside certain classes of
ciphers. This has led researchers to propose several machine
learning-based approaches. One work (Spillman et al. 2017)
used genetic algorithms to recover the secret key of a simple
substitution cipher. A review paper by Prajapat et al. (Pra-
japat and Thankur 2015) proposes cipher classification with
machine learning.
Alallayah et al. (Alallayah et al. 2010) succeeded in using
a small feedforward neural network to decode the Vigenere
cipher. Unfortunately, they phrased the task in a cipher-
specific manner that dramatically simplified the learning ob-
jective. For example, at each step, they gave the model the
single keyphrase character that was necessary to perform de-
cryption. One of the things that makes learning the Vigenere
cipher difficult is choosing that keyphrase character for a
particular time step. We avoid this pitfall by using an ap-
proach that generalizes well across several ciphers.
There are other interesting connections between machine
learning and cryptography. Abadi and Andersen trained
two convolutional neural networks (CNNs) to communicate
with each other while hiding information from from a third.
The authors argue that the two CNNs learned to use a
simple form of encryption to selectively protect information
from the eavesdropper. Another work by Ramamurthy et
al. (Ramamurthy et al. 2017) embedded images directly
into the trainable parameters of a neural network. These
messages could be recovered using a second neural network.
Like our work, these two works use neural networks to
encrypt information. Unlike our work, the models were
neither recurrent nor were they trained on existing ciphers.
Problem setup
We consider the decryption function m = P (k, c) of a
generic polyalphabetic cipher where c is the ciphertext, k
is a key, and m is the plaintext message. Here, m, k, and c
are sequences of symbols a drawn from alphabet Al (which
has length l). Our objective is to train a neural network with
parameters θ to make the approximation PˆNN (k,m, θ) ≈
(a) Data (b) Model
Figure 2: (a) Expressing the decryption process as a sequence-to-sequence translation task. (b) Our Recurrent Neural Network
(RNN) -based model unrolled for time steps 6 to 9 (FC: fully-connected layer).
P (k,m) such that
θˆ = argmin
θ
L(PˆNN (k,m, θ)− P (k, c)) (1)
where L is L2 loss. We chose this loss function because it
penalizes outliers more severely than other loss functions
such as L1. Minimizing outliers is important as the model
converges to high accuracies (e.g. 95+%) and errors become
infrequent. In this equation, P (k, c) is a one-hot vector and
PˆNN is a real-valued softmax distribution over the same
space.
Representing ciphers. In this work, we chose A27 as the
uppercase Roman alphabet plus the null symbol, ’-’. We
encode each symbol ai as a one-hot vector. The sequences
m, k, and c then become matrices with a time dimension
and a one-hot dimension (see Figure 2a). We allow the key
length to vary between 1 and 6 but choose a standard length
of 6 for k and pad extra indices with the null symbol. If N
is the number of time steps to unroll the LSTM during train-
ing, then m and c are N − 6× 27 matrices and k is a 6× 27
matrix. To construct training example (xi, yi), we concate-
nate the key, plaintext, and ciphertext matrices according to
Equations 2 and 3.
xi = (k, c) (2)
yi = (k,m) (3)
Concretely, for the Autokey cipher, we might obtain the fol-
lowing sequences:
input : KEY---ISSIBIGACPUWGNRBTBBBO
target: KEY---YOUKNOWNOTHINGJONSNOW
We could also have fed the model the entire key at each
time step. However, this would have increased the size of
the input layer (and, as a result, total size of θ) introduc-
ing an unnecessary computational cost. We found that the
LSTM could store the keyphrase in its memory cell without
difficulty so we chose the simple concatenation method of
Equations 2 and 3 instead. We found empirical benefit in ap-
pending the keyphrase to the target sequence; loss decreased
more rapidly early in training.
Our model
Recurrent neural networks (RNNs). The simplest RNN
cell takes as input two hidden state vectors: one from the
previous time step and one from the previous layer of the
network. Using indices t = 1 . . . T for time and l = 1 . . . L
for depth, we label them hlt−1 and h
l−1
t respectively. Using
the notation of Karpathy et al. (Karpathy, Johnson, and Fei-
Fei 2016), the RNN update rule is
hlt = tanhW
l
(
hl−1t
hlt−1
)
where h ∈ Rn, W l is a n× 2n parameter matrix, and the
tanh is applied elementwise.
The Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) cell is a variation
of the RNN cell which is easier to train in practice (Hochre-
iter and Schmidhuber 1997). In addition to the hidden state
vector, LSTMs maintain a memory vector, clt. At each time
step, the LSTM can choose to read from, write to, or reset
the cell using three gating mechanisms. The LSTM update
takes the form: ifo
g
 =
sigmsigmsigm
tanh
W l(hl−1t
hlt−1
)
clt = f  clt−1 + i g
hlt = o tanh(clt)
The sigmoid (sigm) and tanh functions are applied
element-wise, and W l is a 4n × 2n matrix. The three gate
vectors i, f, o ∈ Rn control whether the memory is updated,
reset to zero, or its local state is revealed in the hidden
vector, respectively. The entire cell is differentiable, and
the three gating functions reduce the problem of vanishing
gradients (Bengio, Simard, and Frasconi 1994) (Hochreiter
and Schmidhuber 1997).
We used a single LSTM cell capped with a fully-
connected softmax layer for all experiments (Figure 2b). We
also experimented with two and three stacked LSTM lay-
ers and additional fully connected layers between the input
and LSTM layers, but these architectures learned too slowly
or not at all. In our experience, the simplest architecture
worked best.
(a) Train loss (b) Test accuracy
Figure 3: Loss decreases rapidly at first, around 5000 train steps, as the network learns to capture simple statistical distributions.
Later, around 100000 train steps, model learns the Enigma cipher itself and accuracy spikes. A significant portion of training,
starting around 350000 train steps, is spent gaining the last 5% accuracy.
Experiments
We considered three types of polyalphabetic substitution ci-
phers: the Vigenere, Autokey, and Enigma. Each of these
ciphers is composed of various rotations of A, called Caesar
shifts. A one-unit Caesar shift would perform the rotation
A[i] 7→ A[(i+ 1) mod N ].
The Vigenere cipher performs Caesar shifts with distances
that correspond to the indices of a repeated keyphrase. For
a keyphrase k of length z, the Vigenere cipher decrypts a
plaintext message m according to:
P (kit,m
j
t ) = A[(j + (i mod z)) mod l] (4)
where the lower indices of k and m correspond to time and
the upper indices correspond to the index of the symbol in
alphabet Al.
The Autokey cipher is a variant of this idea. Instead of re-
peating the key, it concatenates the plaintext message to the
end of the key, effectively creating a new and non-repetitive
key:
i as in
{
kit, if t ≤ z
mit−z, otherwise
(5)
The Enigma also performs rotations over Al, but with
a function P that is far more complex. The version used
in World War II contained 3 wheels (each with 26 ring
settings), up to 10 plugs, and a reflector, giving it over
1.07 × 1023 possible configurations (Miller 2017). We
selected a constant rotor configuration of A-I-II-III,
ring configuration of 2, 14, 8 and no plugs. For an
explanation of these settings, see (Rejewski 1981). We set
the rotors randomly according to a 3-character key, giving a
subspace of settings that contained 263 possible mappings.
With these settings, our model required several days of
compute time on a Tesla k80 GPU. The rotor and ring
configurations could also be allowed to vary by appending
them to the keyphrase. We tried this, but convergence was
too slow given our limited computational resources.
Synthesizing data. The runtime of P (k,m) was small for
all ciphers so we chose to synthesize training data on-the-fly,
eliminating the need to synthesize and store large datasets.
This also reduced the likelihood of overfitting. We imple-
mented our own Vigenere and Autokey ciphers and used the
historically accurate crypto-enigma2 Python package as
our Enigma simulator.
The symbols of the input sequences k and m were drawn
randomly (with uniform probability) from the Roman al-
phabet, A26. We chose characters with uniform distribution
to make the task more difficult. Had we used grammatical
(e.g. English) text, our model could have improved its
performance on the task simply by memorizing common
n-grams. Differentiating between gains in accuracy due
to learning the Enigma versus those due to learning the
statistical distributions of English would have been difficult.
Optimization. Following previous work by Xavier et al.
(Glorot and Bengio 2010), we use the ’Xavier’ initialization
for all parameters. We use mini-batch stochastic gradient de-
scent with batch size 50 and select parameter-wise learning
rates using Adam (Kingma and Ba 2014) set to a base learn-
ing rate of 5× 10−4 and β = (0.9, 0.999). We trained on ci-
phertext sequences of length 14 and keyphrase sequences of
length 6 for all tasks. As our Enigma configuration accepted
only 3-character keys, we padded the last three entries with
the null character, ’-’.
On the Enigma task, we found that our model’s LSTM
required a memory size of at least 2048 units. The model
converged too slowly or not at all for smaller memory sizes
and multi-cell architectures. We performed experiments on a
model with 3000 hidden units because it converged approx-
imately twice as quickly as the model with 2048 units. For
2http://pypi.python.org/pypi/crypto-enigma
Figure 4: The model, trained on messages of 20 characters,
generalizes well to messages of over 100 characters for the
Vigenere and Autokey ciphers. Generalization occurs on the
Enigma, but to a lesser degree, as the task is far more com-
plex.
the Vigenere and and Autokey ciphers, we explored hidden
memory sizes of 32, 64, 128, 256, and 512. For each cipher,
we halted training after our model achieved 99+% accuracy;
this occurred around 5× 105 train steps on the Enigma task
and 1× 105 train steps on the others.
The number of possible training examples, ≈ 1019,
far exceeded the total number of examples the model
encountered during training, ≈ 107 (each of these examples
were generated on-the-fly). We were, however, concerned
with another type of overfitting. On the Enigma task, our
model contained over thirty million learnable parameters
and encountered each three-letter key hundreds of times
during training. Hence, it was possible that the model might
memorize the mappings from ciphertext to plaintext for all
possible (263) keys. To check for this sort of overfitting, we
withheld a single key, KEY, from training and inspected our
trained model’s performance on a message encrypted with
this key.
Generalization. We evaluated out model on two metrics
for generalization. First, we tested its ability to decrypt
20 randomly-generated test messages using an unseen
keyphrase (’KEY’). It passed this test on all three ciphers.
Second, we measured its ability to decrypt messages
longer than those of the training set. On this test, our
model exhibited some generalization for all three ciphers
but performed particularly well on the Vigenere task,
decoding sequences an order of magnitude longer than
those of the trainign set (see Figure 4). We observed that
the norm of our model’s memory vector increased linearly
with the number of time steps, leading us to hypothesize
that the magnitudes of some hidden activations increase
linearly over time. This phenomenon is probably responsi-
ble for reduced decryption accuracy on very long sequences.
Memory usage. Based on our model’s ability to gener-
(a) Vigenere (hidden unit 252)
(b) Autokey (hidden unit 30)
(c) Enigma (hidden unit 1914)
Figure 5: Shown above are examples of plaintext messages
decrypted by our model. The red and blue heat maps
correspond to the activations of indicated hidden units taken
from the LSTM’s memory vector c. The char index
label corresponds to the index of the plaintext character
in alphabet A. The net shift label corresponds to the
number of Caesar shifts between the ciphertext and the
plaintext.
(a) Hidden unit 252 of the Vigenere model has a neg-
ative activation once every n steps where n is the length of
the keyphrase (examples for n = 3, 4 are shown). We hy-
pothesize that this is a timing unit which allows the model to
index into the keyphrase as a function of the encryption step.
(b) The 30th hidden unit of the Autokey model has
negative activations for specific character indices (e.g. 2 and
14) and positive activations for others (e.g. 6 and 18). We
hypothesize that this shift unit helps the model compute the
magnitude of the Caesar shift between the ciphertext and
plaintext.
(c) The hidden activations of the Enigma model were
generally sparse. Hidden unit 1914 is no exception. For dif-
ferent messages, only its activation magnitude changes. For
different keyphrases, its entire activation pattern (signs and
magnitudes) change. We hypothesize that it is a switch unit
which activates only when the Enigma enters a particular
rotor configuration.
(a) Vigenere task (b) Autokey task
Figure 6: Shown above are test accuracies of our model on the Vigenere and Autokey cipher tasks. Notice that for small RNN
memory sizes (64 and 128 hidden units), the model achieves better performance on the Vigenere task. Meanwhile, for large
memory sizes (256 and 512 hidden units), the model converges to 99+% accuracy more rapidly on the Autokey task. Evidently,
the model’s test accuracy is more sensitive to memory size on the Autokey task than on the Vigenere task.
alize over unseen keyphrases and message lengths, we hy-
pothesized that it learns an efficient internal representation
of each cipher. To explore this idea, we first examined how
activations of various units in the LSTM’s memory vector
changed over time. We found, as shown in Figure 5, that
1) these activations mirrored qualitative properties of the ci-
phers and 2) they varied considerably between the three ci-
phers.
We were also interested in how much memory our model
required to learn each cipher. Early in this work, we ob-
served that the model required a very large memory vector
(at least 2048 hidden units) to master the Enigma task. In
subsequent experiments (Figure 6), we found that the size
of the LSTM’s memory vector was more important when
training on the Autokey task than the Vigenere task. We hy-
pothesize that this is because the model must continually up-
date its internal representation of the keyphrase during the
Autokey task, whereas on the Vigenere task it needs only
store a static representation of the keyphrase. The Enigma,
of course, requires dramatically more memory because it
must store the configurations of three 26-character wheels,
each of which may rotate at a given time step.
Based on these observations, we claim that the amount of
memory our model requires to learn a given cipher can serve
as an informal measure of how much each encryption step
depends on previous encryption steps. When characterizing
a black box cipher, this information may be of interest.
Reconstructing keyphrases. Having verified that our
model learned internal representations of the three ciphers,
we decided to take this property one step further. We trained
our model to predict keyphrases as a function of plaintext
and ciphertext inputs. We used the same model architec-
ture as described earlier, but the input at each timestep be-
came two concatenated one-hot vectors (one corresponding
to the plaintext and one to the ciphertext). Reconstructing
the keyphrase for a Vigenere cipher with known keylength
is trivial: the task reduces to measuring the shifts between
the plaintext and ciphertext characters. We made this task
more difficult by training the model on target keyphrases of
unknown length (1-6 characters long). In most real-world
cryptanalysis applications, the length of the keyphrase is un-
known which also motivated our choice. Our model obtained
99+% accuracy on the task.
Reconstructing the keyphrase of the Autokey was a more
difficult task, as the keyphrase is used only once. This
happens during the first 1-6 steps of encryption. On this
task, accuracy exceeded 95%. In future work, we hope to
reconstruct the keyphrase of the Engima from plaintext and
ciphertext inputs.
Limitations. Our model is data inefficient; it requires at
least a million training examples to learn a cipher. If we were
interested in characterizing an unknown cipher in the real
world, we would not generally have access to unlimited ex-
amples of plaintext and ciphertext pairs.
Most modern encryption techniques rely on public-key
algorithms such as RSA. Learning these functions requires
multiplying and taking the modulus of large numbers. These
algorithmic capabilities are well beyond the scope of our
model. Better machine learning models may be able to learn
simplified versions of RSA, but even these would probably
be data- and computation-inefficient.
Conclusions
This work proposes a fully-differentiable RNN model for
learning the decoding functions of polyalphabetic ciphers.
We show that the model can achieve high accuracy on sev-
eral ciphers, including the the challenging 3-wheel Enigma
cipher. Furthermore, we show that it learns a general algo-
rithmic representation of these ciphers and can perform well
on 1) unseen keyphrases and 2) messages of variable length.
Our work represents the first general method for recon-
structing the functions of polyalphabetic ciphers. The pro-
cess is fully automated and an inspection of trained models
offers a wealth of information about the unknown cipher.
Our findings are generally applicable to analyzing any black
box sequence-to-sequence translation task where the trans-
lation function is a deterministic algorithm. Finally, decod-
ing Enigma messages is a complicated algorithmic task, and
thus we suspect learning this task with an RNN will be of
general interest to the machine learning community.
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